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STATEMENT
OF
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ON
H.R. 12750 -- ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

10:00 A.M.
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 1976
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the

~ubcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to testify in support
of II.R. 12750, a bill that would authorize applications for
court orders approving electronic surveillance to obtain
foreign intelligence information.
is significant.

I believe that the bill

Its provisions have evolved, from the initia-

tive of the President, through bipartisan cooperation and
through discussion between the Executive Branch and Members
of Congress, including members of this Committee, in an effort
to identify and serve the public interest.

This bill will,

I believe, establish critical safeguards to protect individual
rights.

As I said in testimony on the companion Senate bill,

S. 3197, enactment of the bill "will provide major assurance
to the public that electronic surveillance will be used in
the United States for foreign intelligence purposes pursuant
to legislative standards and under procedures requiring
accountability for official action, scrutiny of the action
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Executive officials at regular intervals, and the independent
review, as provided, by a detached and neutral magistrate."
Since you have already heard extensive testimony on
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the bill and are familiar with its provisions, I can perhaps
be of greatest service by foregoing an extended statement
and by responding to your particular questions.

It may be

useful, however, for me to describe in briefest form the
bill's overall design and purpose, and to address certain
concerns about the bill that members of the Subcommittee and
witnesses generally have expressed.
H.R. 12750 provides for the designation by the Chief
Justice of seven district court judges, to whom the Attorney
General, if he is authorized by the President to do so, may
make application for an order approving electronic surveillance
within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.
The judge may grant such an order only if he finds that there
is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and if a
Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate has certified
that the information sought is indeed forelgn intelligence
information that cannot feasibly be obtained by less intrusive
techniques.

Such surveillances may not continue longer than

90 days without securing renewed approval from the court.
There is an emergency provision in the bill which is available
in situations in which there is no possibility of preparing
the necessary papers for the court's review in time to obtain
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administrative action, and to achieve the coherence, stability
and clarity in the law and practice that alone can assure
necessary protection of the Nation's safety and of individual
rights.

I believe the time has come when Congress and the

Executive together can take much-needed steps to give clarity
and coherence to a great part of the law in this area, the
part of the law that concerns domestic electronic surveillance
of foreign powers and their agents for foreign intelligence
purposes.

To bring greater coherence to this field, one must,

of course, build on the thoughts and experiences of the past; to
give reasonable recognition, as the judicial decisions in
general have done, to the confidentiality, judgments and discretion that the President's constitutional responsibilities
require; to give legislative form to the standards and procedures
that experience suggests, and to provide added assurance by
adapting a judicial warrant procedure to the unique characteristics of this area.
The standards and procedures contained in the bill,
particularly its provision for prior judicial approval, draw
upon the traditional criminal law enforcement search warrant
model, the pattern followed in Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Oontrol and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

I think it is accurate

to say that much of the discussion before this Subcommittee
has revolved around those features of the bill that depart
from this traditional model.

The primary purpose of foreign
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intelligence surveillances is not to obtain evidence for
criminal prosecution, although that may be the result in some
cases.

The purpose, instead, is to obtain information con-

cerning the actions of foreign powers and their agents in
this country -- information that may often be critical to
the protection of the Nation from foreign threats.

The

departures from the criminal law enforcement model reflect
this distinct national interest, but these departures are
limited so that there are safeguards for indiv1dual rights
which do not now exist in statutory form.

The bill 1S based

on a belief that it is possible to achieve an accommodation
that both protects individual rights and allows the obtaining
of information necessary to the Nation's safety.
Powell said in the Keith case:

As Justice

"Different standards may be

compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable
both in relation to the leg1timate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our
citizens.

For the warrant application may vary according to

the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of
citizen rights deserving protection."
The bill allows foreign intelligence surveillance
only of persons who there is probable cause to believe are
agents of a foreign power.

Moreover, the agency must be of
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a particular kind, directly related to the kinds of foreign
power activities in which the Government has a legitimate
foreign intelligence interest.

Thus, persons -- not citizens

or resident aliens -- are deemed agents only if they are
officers or employees of a foreign power.

The standard is

much higher for a citizen or resident allen.

For the purpose

of this bill, a citizen or resident alien can be found to be
an agent only if there is probable cause to believe that the
person is acting "pursuant to the direction of a foreign
power," and "is engaged in clandestine intelligence activities,
sabotage, or terrorist actlvities, or who conspires with, or
knowingly aids or abets such a person in engaging in such
activities."
In the course of this Subcommittee's hearings, there
has been some discusslon suggesting that electronic surveillance
of citizens and permanent resident aliens should not be allowed
absent a determination that such persons are violating federallaw.

My own view

is that the concept of "foreign agent"

safely should not be limited in this way.

1\s I noted in a

letter to Senator Kennedy concerning the companion Senate
bill, most of the activities that would, under the bill,
allow surveillance of citizens and resident aliens,

584
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constitute Federal cr1mes.

But other foreign agent acti-

vi ties -- like espionage to acquire trade secrets and
information about industrial processes or foreign personnel
or facilities located in this country; and terrorist or
sabotage activities aimed at private persons or property, or
officials or property of state and local government -- would not,
under current law, be Federal crimes.

Yet such acts vitally

affect the national interest, because they are undertaken
clandestinely within the United States "pursuant to the direction
of a foreign power," the standard employed in the bill.

The

probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment 1S not
measured exclusively by the Government's interest in detecting
violations of criminal law.

Searches for purposes other than

criminal law enforcement historically have been permissible,
if reasonable in light of the circumstances and the Governmental
interest involved.

Information concerning the activities of

foreign agents engaged in intelligence, espionage or sabotage
activities is a valid -- indeed a vital Government interest.
I believe that that interest should be the proper standard of
,.

permissible surveillances under this legislation.

1

realize

it has been suggested that the Federal.espionage act should be
broadened suf f icien tly so that the clandes tine acti vi ties
covered here would all be covered under a Federal criminal law.
I

doubt the wisdom of such a course.
The distinct purpose of foreign intelligence surveil-

lances, as compared to the traditional criminal law enforce-

-
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ment model, also requires different standards regarding
notice to persons surveilled -- standards that have been a
source of concern for some Subcommittee members and witnesses.
The bill provides for notice only when emergency surveillance
has been undertaken without judicial warrant and that surveillance is subsequently disapproved.

In 1967, in Berger v.

New York, the Supreme Court found fault with a New York
surveillance law because it did not limit the absence of
notice to exigent circumstances.

In the foreign intelligence

area, when the surveillance involves agents of foreign powers,
exigent circumstances are invariably present.

A notice

requlrement could seriously jeopardize the collection of
foreign intelligence critical to our Nation's needs by compromising the fact that the target had been identified as
an agent of a foreign power.

In many cases such a compromise

would also have the effect of revealing sources and endangering
the lives of individuals who identified the
agent of a foreign power.

tar~et

as an

Even if notice were limited to

"innocent" Americans incidentally overheard, there could be
no guarantee -- and nothing less would suffice in this sensitive
area -- that they would not disclose the notiflcation to the
foreign agent who was the target.

585
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Professor Van Alstyne expressed to the Subcommittee
concern that the provision allowing appllcations to be made,
without geographical restriction, to anyone of seven district
judges specially designated by the Chief Justice would allow
the Government to apply only to those judges who have proved
most willing to grant approval.

I believe his suggestion

was that authority be given to each Chief Circuit judge to
grant applications for surveillance within his circuit.
The provision as it now stands is based on several
tritical considerations.

Proposed surveillances may prove

to be concentrated in time and place; over time, the focus
of the concentration may shift.

If only one judge in a

given geographlcal area were given authority to approve applications, the burden might prove too great, especially if the
judge is to give each application the rigorous scrutiny that
the interests

involved require.

But designation of more than

one judge in each geographical area would, of course, open the
same opportunity of forum-shopping that is the source of the
present objection.

The bill's provision for seven specially

designated judges, without geograhical limit on jurisdiction,'
allows flexibility in response to the problem of shiftlng
concentrations.

It also meets other important objectives.

- 10 The small number of judges will facilitate the necessary
protection of information.

Mare important, perhaps, each

judge will, Over time, gain experience with the factual
patterns that applications present and will be able to bring
to new applications the critical judgment that is the best
protection against abuse.

Moreover, the small number of

judges will allow a sharing of information and thus the development of common standards.

Such common standards, plus the

possibility that the judges will know if they are more favored
with applications than other designated judges, will, I believe,
provide the greatest assurance that the Government will not be
tempted to forum-shop.
Finally, I want to express my understanding of the
purposes of the bill's section 2528, which deals with the
reservation of Presidential Power.

Discussion of the bill has

suggested a variety of forms which this provision could take.
But in all variations, although some may be more acceptable than
others, the purposes, I believe, are essentially the same.
The bill's definition of electronic surveillance limits
its scope,to gain foreign intelligence information when the
target is a foreign power or its agents, to interceptions within
the United States.

The bill does not purport to cover interceptiorJ

of all international communications where, for example, the
interception would be

accom~lished

outside of the United States,

or, to take another example, a radio transmission does not have
both the sender and all intended

recipients within the United

bUb
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circumstances that do not fit the analysis and system this bill
would impose.

This is not to say that the development of

legislative safeguards in the international communications area
is impossible.

I know it will be extremely difficult and will

involve different considerations.

I

believe it will be

unfortunate, therefore, to delay the creation of safeguards
in the area with which this bill deals until the attempt is
made to cover what is essentially a different area with
different problems.

An additional reason for the reservation

of Presidential power is

tha~

even in the area covered by the

bill, it is conceivable that there may be unprecedented, unforeseen
circumstances of the utmost danger not contemplated in the
legislation in which restrictions unintentionally would bring
paralysis where all would regard action as imperative.

One of

the purposes of the Presidential power provision, therefore,
is simply to make clear that the bill was not intended to
,

affect Presidential powers in areas beyond its scope, including
areas which, because of utmost danger, were not contemplated
by Congress in its enactment.

In the reservation of Presidential

power, where the circumstances are beyond the scope or events
contemplated in the bill, the bill in no way expands or
contracts the President's constitutional powers.

As the Supreme

Court said of Section 2511 (3) of Title III, "Congress simply
left Presidential powers where it found them."

The reservation

cannot and does not authorize domestic surveillance held
unconstitutional in the Keith case.

~
~
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- 12 The express provision that the bill is not to have
effect beyond its Scope would perhaps not be so critical if the
section did not also make clear the intent--an intent that I
find clear from the bill as a whole--that within its Scope and
its intended coverage the bill's requirements are mandatory.
a letter to Senator Kennedy concerning

In

the companion Senate bill,

I stated that "this provision would represent the expression
of congressional and presidential intent that the President
use the procedures established by the bill for all national
security surveillance which falls within the Scope of this
legislation.

At the same time, it would assure that every

situation important to the national interest would be covered-either by the warrant procedure of the bill or by the President's
inherent constitutional power, however that power may be defined
by the courts, to conduct electronic surveillance with respect
to foreign pOwers.

I reaffirm, however,

.... that it will be

the policy and intent of the Department of Justice, if this bill
is enacted, to proceed exclusively pursuant to judicial warrant
with respect to all electrollic surveillance against domestic
communications of American citizens or permanent resident
.aliens. "
As you know, a difference of opinion may exist as to
whether it is within the constitutional power of Congress to
prescribe, by statute, the standards and procedures by which
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essential to the national security.

I believe t.ha t the standards

and procedures mandated by the bill are constitutional.

The

Supreme Court's decision in the Steel Siezure case seems to
me to indicate that when a statute prescribes a method of
domestic action adequate to the President's duty to protect
the national security, the President is legally obliged to
follow it.

My view, of course, does not foreclose future

administrations from arguing or acting upon the contrary
position.

Nor can Congress decide the constitutional question.

But Congress can do what this bill clearly does:
constitutional

if it is

to mandate the bill's requirements within

its defined scope, it is the statute's intent to do so.
To repeat, I believe that the bill's enactment would
be a significant accomplishment in the service of the liberty
and security of our people.

